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ABSTRACT	  	  RYAN	  HENRY:	  The	  Termination	  of	  Government	  Programs:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  Program	  	  (Under	  the	  direction	  of	  Jonathan	  Winburn)	  	  	  One	  common	  view	  is	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  government	  programs	  persist	  beyond	  their	  useful	  lifespans	  giving	  the	  impression	  that	  once	  installed,	  government	  programs	  are	  ‘immortal’.	  	  However,	  termination	  of	  government	  programs	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  process.	  	  Several	  factors	  determine	  the	  projected	  lifespan	  of	  a	  program,	  and	  a	  program	  may	  be	  effectively	  terminated	  using	  several	  mechanisms.	  	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program,	  a	  program	  designed	  to	  prevent	  fraud,	  waste,	  and	  abuse	  in	  the	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  systems,	  shows	  that	  watchdog	  programs	  are	  inherently	  more	  prone	  to	  termination	  than	  other	  types	  of	  government	  programs.	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CHAPTER	  1:	  Longevity	  Factors	  
	  	   The	  incremental	  evolution	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  huge	  number	  of	  government	  programs	  and	  agencies.	  	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  United	  States	  established	  the	  main	  branches	  of	  government	  and	  their	  functions.	  	  These	  functions	  have	  expanded	  as	  Americans	  have	  generally	  been	  eager	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  government	  to	  resolve	  issues	  that	  the	  market	  did	  not	  seem	  able	  to.	  	  Therefore,	  each	  presidential	  administration	  and	  Congress	  has	  created	  agencies,	  procedures,	  and	  programs	  to	  address	  individual	  issues	  as	  they	  arise	  (DiIulio,	  Garvey,	  &	  Kettl,	  1993,	  p.	  13).	  	  	  	   Efficiency	  is	  one	  goal	  of	  any	  government	  entity.	  	  Traditionally,	  specialization	  has	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  method	  to	  achieve	  it.	  	  However,	  the	  specialization	  of	  agencies	  and	  procedures	  often	  result	  in	  a	  tangled	  web	  of	  overlapping	  and	  conflicting	  government	  programs	  (Dijulio	  et	  al.,	  1993,	  p.13).	  Once	  enacted,	  many	  government	  programs	  appear	  to	  be	  ‘immortal’.	  	  New	  programs	  are	  consistently	  proposed	  and	  enacted,	  but	  the	  rate	  of	  program	  closure	  is	  much	  slower.	  	  Even	  inefficient	  or	  irrelevant	  programs	  that	  would	  never	  survive	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  market	  place	  seem	  to	  persist	  in	  the	  bureaucracy.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  government	  program	  in	  1987	  established	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Negotiator.	  	  Its	  purpose	  was	  to	  negotiate	  a	  to	  build	  a	  safe	  storage	  facility	  for	  nuclear	  waste.	  	  This	  goal	  overlaps	  with	  multiple	  other	  programs	  such	  as	  the	  Defense	  Nuclear	  Facilities	  Board,	  the	  Presidential	  Commission	  on	  Catastrophic	  Nuclear	  Disasters,	  the	  
	   	   	  2	  
Nuclear	  Waste	  Technical	  Review	  Board,	  and	  about	  six	  other	  offices.	  	  The	  Office	  of	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Negotiator’s	  responsibilities	  have	  been	  wholly	  absorbed	  by	  other	  entities.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  Office	  of	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Negotiator	  is	  out	  of	  date,	  unnecessary	  and	  costs	  taxpayers	  approximately	  $1	  million	  a	  year,	  the	  office	  has	  not	  been	  eliminated	  (Jenkins,	  Mondelli,	  &	  Wilson,	  2007,	  p.	  12).	  There	  is	  a	  straightforward	  explanation	  for	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  Government	  programs	  are	  established	  to	  fix	  a	  problem	  or	  to	  fill	  a	  need	  in	  the	  community	  that	  the	  market	  place	  cannot	  at	  a	  certain	  point	  in	  time.	  	  Once	  implemented,	  citizens	  begin	  to	  rely	  on	  government	  aid	  and	  expect	  to	  continue	  receiving	  those	  services.	  	  Termination	  of	  the	  programs	  would	  cause	  unforeseen	  difficulties	  and	  hardship	  throughout	  certain	  portions	  of	  the	  society.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  government	  generally	  determines	  that	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  terminating	  programs	  is	  too	  high	  so	  inefficient	  or	  unnecessary	  programs	  persist	  (Kaufman,	  1976,	  p.	  64).	  	  	  	  
Seven	  Factors	  that	  Influence	  the	  Lifespan	  of	  Government	  Programs	  Herbert	  Kaufman,	  a	  respected	  researcher	  and	  member	  of	  the	  Brookings	  Institute,	  takes	  a	  more	  in	  depth	  look	  at	  the	  reasons	  government	  programs	  enjoy	  such	  security.	  	  He	  identifies	  seven	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  longevity	  of	  government	  programs	  and	  help	  explain	  why	  they	  often	  appear	  immortal.	  	  	  Three	  of	  these	  factors	  concern	  the	  creation	  method	  of	  the	  program.	  	  Kaufman	  argues	  that	  government	  programs	  established	  by	  entities	  other	  than	  Congress	  have	  longer	  lifespans.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  government	  programs	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  Congress.	  In	  fact,	  many	  programs	  are	  established	  by	  administrative	  agencies.	  	  Often	  times	  after	  an	  agency	  establishes	  a	  program,	  the	  agency	  will	  secure	  the	  continued	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existence	  of	  its	  pet	  program	  through	  statutes	  or	  mentions	  in	  an	  appropriations	  act.	  	  Secure	  funding	  and	  the	  agency’s	  interest	  in	  the	  program’s	  success	  provide	  protection	  from	  termination.	  	  For	  these	  reasons,	  programs	  implemented	  by	  administrative	  agencies	  generally	  enjoy	  longer	  lifespans	  than	  those	  created	  by	  Congress.	  Even	  safer	  than	  programs	  created	  by	  agencies	  are	  the	  programs	  totally	  insulated	  from	  departmental	  or	  presidential	  control.	  	  Congress	  is	  the	  only	  governing	  body	  that	  has	  the	  power	  to	  terminate	  such	  programs.	  	  They	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  virtually	  indestructible	  and	  protected	  from	  the	  whims	  of	  the	  executive	  branch	  during	  political	  ideology	  changes.	  	  In	  theory,	  this	  stability	  allows	  the	  programs	  to	  better	  do	  their	  jobs.	  Examples	  of	  these	  programs	  include	  the	  United	  States	  Postal	  Service,	  the	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation,	  and	  the	  Veterans	  Administration	  (Kaufman,	  1976,	  p.	  8).	  	  	  Programs	  with	  a	  strong	  relationship	  to	  current	  member	  of	  Congress	  are	  also	  less	  likely	  to	  face	  termination.	  	  Generally,	  the	  member	  of	  Congress	  who	  originally	  sponsors	  or	  helps	  create	  a	  program	  will	  fight	  for	  that	  program	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  in	  office	  as	  the	  program	  may	  serve	  their	  constituency	  or	  bolster	  their	  chances	  of	  re-­‐election.	  	  Legislators	  with	  seniority	  may	  have	  enough	  political	  clout	  to	  prevent	  legislation	  that	  endangers	  their	  program	  from	  reaching	  the	  floor	  (Jenkins	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  14).	  	  Overtime,	  committees	  and	  subcommittees,	  staff	  members,	  and	  other	  legislators	  involved	  with	  the	  program	  develop	  protective	  attitudes	  toward	  them.	  	  This	  also	  helps	  explain	  longevity	  (Kaufman,	  1976,	  p.	  5).	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Unlike	  the	  first	  three	  factors,	  the	  fourth	  factor	  for	  longevity	  benefits	  all	  government	  programs.	  	  The	  sheer	  size	  of	  the	  government	  allows	  inefficient	  programs	  to	  survive.	  	  The	  annual	  budget	  for	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government	  is	  nearly	  $3.8	  trillion	  (Federal	  Spending,	  n.d.).	  	  The	  annual	  budget	  is	  so	  large	  that	  Congress	  does	  not	  rewrite	  it	  from	  the	  beginning	  each	  year.	  	  Instead,	  the	  previous	  year’s	  budget	  is	  used	  as	  a	  base	  line	  and	  legislators	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  increase	  or	  decrease	  funding	  by	  a	  certain	  amount.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  budget	  has	  a	  certain	  incremental	  momentum.	  	  Therefore,	  total	  elimination	  of	  funds	  for	  a	  program	  is	  virtually	  unheard	  of	  (Kaufman,	  1976,	  p.	  7).	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  government	  programs	  contribute	  to	  their	  own	  success	  by	  becoming	  active	  participants	  in	  the	  political	  process	  and	  advocating	  for	  themselves.	  	  Leaders	  and	  employees	  of	  a	  program	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  its	  survival.	  	  Both	  groups	  rely	  on	  the	  program	  for	  job	  security	  and	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  organizational	  loyalty.	  	  When	  a	  program	  has	  a	  history	  of	  success,	  its	  employees	  and	  administration	  tend	  to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  pride	  in	  their	  service	  to	  the	  nation.	  	  Program	  leaders	  often	  exhibit	  program	  loyalty.	  	  They	  also	  have	  even	  stronger	  incentives	  to	  preserve	  the	  organization.	  	  Often	  the	  leaders’	  professional	  reputation	  and	  future	  are	  reliant	  upon	  the	  program’s	  success.	  	  Both	  employees	  and	  leaders	  are	  strong	  advocates	  during	  the	  political	  process	  (Kaufman,	  1976,	  p.	  9).	  Programs	  also	  receive	  support	  from	  outside	  entities.	  	  Citizens	  that	  benefit	  from	  and	  clients	  that	  work	  with	  a	  particular	  program	  are	  reliable,	  passionate	  supporters.	  	  More	  surprisingly,	  agencies	  that	  a	  program	  regulates	  will	  also	  rise	  to	  their	  defense.	  	  Initially	  one	  would	  think	  that	  an	  entity	  being	  regulated	  would	  resent	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the	  controlling	  program.	  	  However,	  many	  regulated	  entities	  benefit	  from	  the	  control.	  	  For	  example,	  government	  programs	  may	  restrict	  access	  to	  a	  marketplace	  or	  prohibit	  destructive	  practices,	  which	  protect	  those	  under	  their	  control.	  	  Therefore,	  they	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  the	  controlling	  program	  and	  will	  advocate	  on	  their	  behalf	  (Kaufman,	  1976,	  p.	  10).	  Lastly,	  professional	  and	  trade	  associations	  may	  be	  allies	  to	  government	  programs	  in	  their	  sector.	  	  Some	  government	  programs	  impose	  professional	  standards	  in	  an	  occupation	  or	  are	  so	  involved	  in	  the	  industry	  they	  become	  an	  interest	  group.	  	  Professional	  and	  trade	  associations	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  that	  only	  qualified	  individuals	  are	  allowed	  to	  practice	  in	  their	  field.	  	  This	  guarantees	  that	  their	  job	  market	  does	  not	  become	  flooded	  and	  preserves	  the	  integrity	  of	  their	  work.	  	  Politically,	  each	  trade	  has	  particular	  interests	  and	  the	  involvement	  in	  government	  programs	  is	  a	  way	  to	  influence	  policy.	  	  Professional	  and	  trade	  associations	  can	  become	  very	  effective	  lobbying	  groups	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  government	  program	  when	  mobilized	  (Kaufman,	  1976,	  p.	  11).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Government	  programs,	  by	  nature,	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  long	  lasting.	  	  Simply	  by	  fixing	  a	  problem	  that	  the	  marketplace	  cannot	  government	  programs	  gain	  the	  support	  of	  the	  people	  and	  become	  difficult	  to	  uninstall.	  	  Additionally,	  Kaufman’s	  seven	  factors	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  program	  will	  have	  a	  long	  lifespan.	  	  Given	  this	  framework,	  one	  can	  understand	  how	  even	  outdated	  or	  irrelevant	  government	  programs	  continue	  to	  receive	  funding.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  government	  programs	  are	  constructed	  for	  durability,	  program	  termination	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process.	  	  Just	  as	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Kaufman	  identifies	  factors	  that	  improve	  a	  program’s	  expected	  lifespan,	  there	  are	  factors	  inherent	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  programs	  that	  put	  them	  at	  higher	  risk	  for	  termination.	  	  	  Watchdog	  programs,	  which	  protect	  the	  public	  interest	  by	  fighting	  fraud	  and	  abuse,	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  face	  closure	  than	  other	  types	  of	  programs.	  	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  following	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  (RAC)	  program.	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CHAPTER	  2:	  	  Termination	  Factors	  
	  
	   While	  some	  believe	  that	  government	  programs	  are	  “immortal,”	  others	  argue	  that	  program	  termination	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process.	  	  Termination	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  deliberate	  conclusion	  or	  cessation	  of	  specific	  government	  functions,	  programs,	  policies,	  or	  organizations”	  (Daniels,	  1997,	  p.	  5).	  	  Among	  them	  is	  Robert	  P.	  Biller,	  a	  political	  scientist,	  who	  argues	  that	  a	  rational	  policy	  making	  cycle	  must	  include	  termination	  in	  order	  to	  free	  up	  resources	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  policies.	  	  Outdated	  programs’	  goals	  and	  functions	  may	  have	  changed	  over	  time,	  they	  may	  use	  valuable	  government	  resources	  to	  address	  issues	  that	  have	  been	  corrected	  or	  have	  been	  surpassed	  in	  efficiency	  by	  younger	  programs.	  	  In	  this	  way	  of	  thinking,	  government	  programs	  must	  be	  terminated	  and	  their	  resources	  reallocated	  to	  more	  beneficial	  programs	  to	  ensure	  the	  best	  for	  society	  (Daniels,	  1997,	  p.	  31-­‐32).	  	  	  In	  fact,	  statistics	  show	  that	  policy	  termination,	  though	  not	  common,	  is	  a	  viable	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  cycle.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  study	  by	  Lewis	  conducted	  between	  1946	  and	  1997	  showed	  that	  62%	  of	  government	  programs	  created	  in	  that	  period	  were	  also	  eliminated	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  93).	  	  During	  their	  first	  decade	  of	  operation,	  government	  programs	  have	  a	  4-­‐5%	  chance	  of	  termination	  annually.	  	  After	  their	  initial	  10	  years	  of	  operation,	  that	  number	  drops	  to	  a	  1%	  chance	  of	  termination	  each	  year	  (Berry,	  Burden,	  &	  Howell,	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  	  Given	  these	  statistics	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  time	  in	  a	  program’s	  lifespan	  is	  the	  first	  ten	  years,	  during	  which	  termination	  is	  a	  real	  threat.	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Three	  Reasons	  for	  Termination	  Peter	  DeLeon	  identified	  three	  main	  reasons	  for	  termination.	  	  These	  reasons	  are	  financial	  imperatives,	  government	  efficiencies,	  and	  political	  ideology.	  	  	  Financial	  imperatives	  and	  government	  efficiencies	  both	  concern	  government	  resources	  and	  funding.	  	  Political	  ideology	  concerns	  the	  overall	  sentiment	  of	  the	  governing	  body.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  aspects	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  lifespan	  of	  a	  government	  program	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  95).	  DeLeon’s	  first	  potential	  reason	  for	  program	  termination	  is	  the	  government’s	  financial	  imperative.	  Termination	  may	  be	  financially	  imperative	  during	  budget	  cuts	  or	  shrinking	  tax	  revenue	  where	  eliminating	  a	  program	  is	  politically	  feasible.	  	  Hard	  economic	  times	  pressure	  governments	  to	  cut	  spending	  and	  in	  turn,	  government	  programs.	  	  Governments	  will	  cut	  unnecessary	  programs	  during	  harsh	  economic	  times	  in	  order	  to	  funnel	  funding	  to	  programs	  essential	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  nation	  (Daniel,	  1997).	  These	  cuts	  are	  often	  made	  by	  reorganizing	  or	  eliminating	  existing	  government	  programs.	  This	  is	  particularly	  impactful	  during	  wartimes.	  	  Agency	  termination	  rates	  are	  250%	  higher	  during	  times	  of	  war	  than	  during	  times	  of	  peace	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  95).	  	  Lewis	  attributes	  this	  to	  the	  President’s	  shuffling	  of	  government	  responsibilities	  between	  agencies	  to	  prepare	  to	  mobilize	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  97).	  	  Competition	  between	  government	  programs	  for	  resources	  also	  falls	  under	  the	  financial	  imperatives	  umbrella.	  	  The	  federal	  government	  has	  a	  large,	  but	  limited,	  amount	  of	  funds	  it	  can	  allocate	  for	  programs	  to	  operate.	  	  Government	  program	  budgets	  range	  from	  miniscule	  allotments,	  such	  as	  $1,438	  for	  Certain	  Veterans	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Receiving	  VA	  Pension	  in	  2003,	  to	  multibillion	  dollar	  operating	  budgets	  for	  Social	  Security	  and	  Pell	  Grants.	  	  All	  government	  programs	  were	  created	  to	  solve	  particular	  social	  issues	  at	  particular	  points	  in	  time.	  	  This	  creates	  a	  system	  where	  programs	  have	  overlapping	  initiatives,	  unclear	  jurisdictions	  and	  mutual	  funding	  resources.	  Therefore,	  programs	  with	  similar	  goals	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  for	  funding.	  	  This	  competition	  shortens	  some	  programs	  lifespans	  (Berry	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  For	  example,	  in	  2013,	  the	  Obama	  Administration	  terminated	  funding	  for	  the	  Electric	  Guaranteed	  Underwriting	  program,	  which	  provided	  funds	  to	  rural	  areas	  to	  improve	  telephone	  services,	  because	  it	  provided	  the	  same	  service	  as	  a	  program	  run	  by	  the	  Rural	  Utilities	  Service	  (United	  States,	  n.d.,	  p.	  41).	  	  	  Competition	  for	  funding	  is	  a	  financial	  imperative	  that	  limits	  the	  lifespan	  of	  certain	  federal	  programs.	  DeLeon’s	  second	  reason	  for	  government	  program	  termination	  is	  inefficiency.	  	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  a	  program	  or	  agency	  may	  be	  deemed	  inefficient.	  	  Bureaucratic	  leaders	  may	  determine	  that	  a	  program’s	  services	  are	  not	  worth	  the	  cost	  incurred,	  the	  program	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  relevant,	  the	  need	  for	  an	  updated	  program	  may	  arise	  from	  a	  crisis	  or	  event,	  technologies	  may	  develop	  that	  render	  the	  program	  obsolete	  or	  a	  program’s	  services	  may	  overlap	  with	  another	  program.	  (Daniel,	  1997,	  p.	  35).	  	  	  Changing	  circumstances	  are	  a	  common	  cause	  of	  these	  issues.	  	  As	  time	  elapses,	  the	  nation’s	  needs,	  economy	  and	  technological	  advances	  change	  (Thomas,	  189).	  	  	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Comprehensive	  Employment	  and	  Training	  Act	  (CERTA)	  and	  the	  State	  Indoor	  Radon	  Grant	  (SIRG)	  were	  terminated	  for	  efficiency	  reasons.	  	  CERTA	  was	  created	  in	  1973	  to	  provide	  job	  training	  and	  job	  search	  assistance	  for	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disadvantaged	  or	  unemployed	  individuals.	  	  The	  program	  was	  terminated	  because	  the	  cost	  of	  training	  potential	  employees	  was	  determined	  to	  outweigh	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  individuals	  becoming	  a	  part	  of	  the	  workforce	  (Daniels,	  1997,	  p.	  6).	  	  In	  2013,	  the	  Obama	  administration	  eliminated	  funding	  for	  SIRG,	  a	  program	  that	  helped	  states’	  assess	  radon	  risk	  and	  diminish	  it,	  because	  the	  program	  was	  outdated.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  states	  had	  developed	  the	  technology	  to	  assess	  and	  diminish	  radon	  risk	  independently	  (United	  States,	  n.d.,	  p.	  105).	  	   DeLeon’s	  third	  reason	  for	  termination,	  political	  ideology	  changes,	  may	  be	  the	  most	  influential	  factor	  in	  a	  government	  program’s	  longevity.	  	  Political	  turnover	  often	  results	  in	  a	  new	  political	  ideology	  taking	  hold	  and	  reshaping	  the	  administration	  and	  its	  programs.	  	  As	  a	  new	  majority	  takes	  over	  government,	  they	  use	  their	  newly	  found	  power	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  or	  lessen	  support	  of	  programs	  they	  opposed	  as	  the	  minority	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  92;	  Daniels,	  1997,	  p.	  33).	  	  Given	  these	  findings,	  a	  program	  instituted	  under	  a	  Republican	  President	  and	  Congress	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  terminated	  under	  a	  solidly	  Democratic	  government	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  94).	  	  Presidential	  turnover	  is	  particularly	  threatening.	  	  New	  presidents	  often	  reorganize	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  government	  programs	  to	  gain	  power	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  their	  terms	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  95).	  Lewis	  found	  that	  a	  President	  that	  gains	  power	  and	  is	  opposed	  to	  a	  program	  increases	  its	  likelihood	  of	  mortality	  by	  67%	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  97).	  	  	  	   The	  termination	  and	  reinstallation	  of	  the	  B-­‐1	  bomber	  program	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  president	  to	  dictate	  a	  program’s	  lifespan.	  	  The	  B-­‐1	  strategic	  bomber	  was	  the	  most	  technologically	  advanced	  aircraft	  in	  the	  1960s,	  and	  
	   	   	  11	  
was	  used	  to	  drop	  the	  atomic	  bombs	  on	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki.	  	  In	  1973,	  the	  American	  Friends	  Service	  Committee	  rallied	  thousands	  of	  citizens	  to	  oppose	  taxpayer	  funding	  for	  the	  aircrafts	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  continue	  the	  antiwar	  sentiment	  felt	  after	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  The	  B-­‐1	  became	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  1976	  presidential	  race.	  	  Democrats	  took	  a	  firm	  stance	  next	  to	  the	  American	  Friends	  Service	  Committee.	  	  When	  President	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  a	  Democrat,	  took	  office,	  one	  of	  his	  first	  moves	  was	  to	  terminate	  the	  development	  of	  the	  B-­‐1	  bomber.	  	  Four	  years	  later,	  Republican	  Ronald	  Reagan	  took	  office	  and	  resurrected	  the	  program.	  	  Operational	  B-­‐1	  bombers	  were	  being	  flown	  again	  by	  1982	  (Daniels,	  1997,	  p.	  3).	  	  This	  example	  not	  only	  demonstrates	  the	  power	  a	  president	  has	  over	  particular	  programs,	  but	  also	  shows	  the	  impact	  of	  changing	  political	  ideology.	  	  Presidential	  and	  party	  powers	  have	  an	  incredible	  effect	  on	  the	  longevity	  of	  government	  programs.	  	  	  The	  composition	  of	  controlling	  power	  also	  influences	  programs’	  lifespans.	  	  Program	  lifespans	  are	  generally	  lengthened	  when	  their	  supporting	  party	  gains	  power	  and	  shortened	  when	  the	  opposing	  party	  gains	  power	  (Berry	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  p.	  1).	  	  Unified	  governments,	  where	  the	  same	  political	  party	  holds	  the	  presidency	  and	  congress,	  are	  the	  most	  dangerous	  for	  government	  programs	  as	  they	  terminate	  roughly	  twice	  as	  many	  programs	  as	  a	  divided	  government.	  	  Divided	  governments	  see	  much	  lower	  rates	  of	  termination.	  	  When	  each	  party	  controls	  a	  part	  of	  the	  government,	  proponents	  of	  a	  program	  generally	  have	  enough	  power	  to	  block	  attempts	  at	  its	  removal	  (Lewis,	  2002,	  p.	  97).	  	  The	  power	  distribution	  of	  divided	  governments	  improves	  the	  lifespan	  of	  government	  programs.	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The	  termination	  of	  government	  programs	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  lifecycle.	  	  DeLeon	  presents	  financial	  imperatives,	  government	  efficiencies,	  and	  political	  ideology	  as	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  dissolution	  of	  programs.	  	  This	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  programs	  such	  as	  Electric	  Guaranteed	  Underwriting,	  which	  was	  terminated	  because	  of	  financial	  imperatives.	  	  	  CERTA	  is	  an	  example	  of	  government	  cutting	  inefficient	  spending.	  External	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  political	  environment	  also	  result	  in	  the	  termination	  of	  government	  programs.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  History	  of	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  Program	  	  
	   The	  discovery	  of	  blatant	  and	  outrageous	  fraud	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  spurred	  discussions	  concerning	  program	  integrity	  throughout	  Washington.	  	  In	  1990,	  John	  Schilling	  worked	  as	  a	  mid-­‐level	  accountant	  for	  the	  Columbia	  Hospital	  Corporation,	  a	  for-­‐profit	  company	  that	  owned	  and	  managed	  a	  huge	  network	  of	  hospitals	  across	  the	  country.	  	  After	  prompting	  from	  a	  government	  fiscal	  intermediary	  tasked	  to	  ensure	  the	  company’s	  accounting	  actions	  were	  legal,	  Schilling	  began	  looking	  into	  the	  company’s	  financial	  reports.	  	  His	  superiors	  made	  every	  effort	  to	  block	  his	  inquiries	  about	  inconsistencies	  he	  discovered.	  	  At	  that	  point,	  Schilling	  realized	  the	  company	  was	  involved	  in	  unethical,	  if	  not	  illegal,	  activity.	  	  Afraid	  of	  being	  pinned	  as	  the	  scapegoat	  if	  fraud	  was	  discovered,	  Schilling	  filed	  a	  qui	  
tam	  or	  whistleblower’s	  lawsuit	  against	  Columbia	  Hospital	  Association.	  	  He	  teamed	  up	  with	  the	  Justice	  Department	  and	  worked	  as	  an	  FBI	  informant	  to	  bring	  down	  several	  firms	  involved	  in	  defrauding	  the	  Medicare	  Trust	  Fund.	  	  The	  lawsuit	  resulted	  in	  Columbia	  Hospital	  Association	  returning	  $1.7	  billion	  of	  improperly	  claimed	  money	  to	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  need	  for	  program	  integrity	  efforts	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system	  (Schilling,	  2010).	  	  The	  issue	  of	  fraud,	  waste	  and	  abuse	  in	  government	  programs,	  particularly	  healthcare,	  became	  a	  hot	  topic	  and	  prompted	  the	  creation	  of	  healthcare	  integrity	  programs.	  	  In	  a	  broad	  sense,	  the	  design	  of	  integrity	  programs	  are	  to	  ensure	  that	  government	  institutions	  are	  organizationally,	  structurally,	  and	  ethically	  sound.	  	  In	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most	  cases,	  they	  protect	  the	  public	  interest	  by	  preventing	  fraud	  and	  abuse	  in	  government	  organizations	  that	  offer	  a	  service	  to	  the	  people.	  	  For	  example,	  welfare	  and	  healthcare	  are	  both	  monitored	  by	  integrity	  programs	  (Dayton	  &	  Duttweiller,	  2009).	  	  Integrity	  programs	  may	  be	  government	  entities,	  contracted	  by	  the	  government,	  or	  independent	  agencies.	  	  
History	  of	  the	  Medicare	  &	  Medicaid	  Programs	  Once	  light	  was	  shed	  on	  the	  topic,	  it	  did	  not	  take	  long	  for	  people	  to	  realize	  that	  Medicare	  is	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  fraud,	  waste,	  and	  abuse.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  national	  health	  insurance	  system	  for	  the	  United	  States	  first	  emerged	  as	  part	  of	  President	  Teddy	  Roosevelt’s	  platform	  in	  1912.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  President	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson	  established	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  in	  1965	  that	  it	  became	  a	  reality.	  	  Originally,	  Medicare	  was	  established	  to	  ensure	  that	  Americans	  65	  years	  and	  older	  were	  guaranteed	  health	  insurance.	  	  The	  federally	  funded	  program	  also	  covered	  younger	  individuals	  with	  certain	  medical	  issues,	  such	  as	  disabilities.	  	  Medicaid	  was	  established	  to	  provide	  health	  insurance	  to	  low	  income	  individuals	  (Stanton,	  2013).	  	  	  The	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  programs	  have	  expanded	  since	  the	  1960s,	  so	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  program	  has	  changed	  to	  accommodate	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  beneficiaries.	  	  The	  federal	  government	  runs	  Medicare	  and	  everyone	  that	  has	  paid	  social	  security	  is	  automatically	  enrolled	  at	  age	  65	  while	  the	  states	  administer	  Medicaid.	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  individuals	  pay	  premiums	  and/or	  a	  deductible	  for	  coverage	  in	  both	  programs	  (Stanton,	  2013).	  	  That	  means	  that	  when	  an	  individual	  with	  Medicare	  or	  Medicaid	  goes	  to	  the	  hospital,	  they	  pay	  the	  deductible	  and	  the	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hospital	  bills	  either	  Medicare	  or	  Medicaid	  for	  the	  services	  they	  provided	  to	  the	  patients.	  	  This	  payment	  structure	  is	  called	  a	  Fee-­‐for-­‐Service	  (FFS)	  program.	  	  Medicaid	  and	  Medicare	  are	  two	  of	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  important	  programs	  in	  the	  nation.	  	  Millions	  of	  Americans	  rely	  on	  their	  services	  to	  keep	  themselves	  and	  their	  families	  healthy	  and	  financially	  stable.	  	  In	  2011,	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  with	  Medicare	  or	  Medicare	  surpassed	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  employed	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  (Jeffrey,	  2012).	  	  Medicare	  alone	  receives	  upwards	  of	  1.3	  billion	  claims	  annually,	  or	  almost	  10,000	  claims	  per	  minute	  (Center	  for	  Medicare	  &	  Medicaid	  Services,	  2008,	  p.	  9).	  	  In	  2014,	  Marilyn	  Tavenner,	  the	  administrator	  of	  the	  Centers	  for	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  Services	  states	  that	  the	  programs	  provide	  insurance	  to	  more	  than	  102	  million	  individuals,	  or	  almost	  1	  out	  of	  every	  3	  Americans	  (Tavenner,	  2014).	  	  These	  programs	  have	  become	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  American	  healthcare	  system.	  Despite	  its	  immense	  size,	  the	  Medicare	  system	  is	  in	  danger.	  	  Experts	  say	  that	  funding	  for	  Medicare	  will	  be	  exhausted	  by	  2030	  (Tavenner,	  2014).	  	  Additionally,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Medicare	  system	  puts	  it	  at	  risk	  for	  abuse.	  	  The	  FFS	  model	  is	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  claims	  that	  do	  not	  meet	  Medicare’s	  medical	  necessity	  criteria,	  claims	  that	  are	  incorrectly	  coded	  or	  documented,	  and	  claims	  that	  should	  have	  been	  made	  to	  different	  health	  insurance	  companies	  (Center	  for	  Medicare	  &	  Medicaid	  Services,	  2008,	  p.5).	  	  In	  fact,	  a	  2013	  study	  by	  PricewaterhouseCoopers	  found	  that	  Medicare	  loses	  approximately	  $1.2	  trillion	  to	  fraud,	  waste,	  and	  abuse	  annually	  (Keating,	  2013).	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	  16	  
Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  Demonstration	  2005-­‐2008	  
	   In	  January	  of	  2015,	  two	  doctors	  were	  found	  guilty	  of	  defrauding	  Medicare	  for	  $97	  million.	  	  The	  doctors	  owned	  a	  healthcare	  clinic	  specializing	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  mental	  illnesses.	  	  The	  doctors	  wrongfully	  diagnosed	  patients	  with	  an	  illness	  that	  required	  an	  expensive	  therapy	  treatment	  and	  billed	  Medicare	  for	  the	  procedure.	  	  Upon	  investigation,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  the	  doctor’s	  patients	  were	  not	  treated	  at	  all	  -­‐	  they	  were	  coloring	  and	  watching	  movies	  (Department	  of	  Justice,	  2015).	  	  This	  is	  an	  extreme	  case	  of	  Medicare	  fraud,	  but	  it	  highlights	  the	  necessity	  of	  an	  integrity	  program	  within	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  	  	   Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  are	  two	  of	  the	  top	  three	  programs	  with	  the	  most	  improper	  payments	  (Health	  &	  Human	  Services,	  2008,	  p.	  7).	  	  Fraud,	  waste,	  and	  abuse	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system	  come	  in	  several	  forms.	  	  There	  is	  intentional	  fraud	  exemplified	  by	  the	  two	  doctors	  with	  the	  mental	  health	  facility.	  	  Another	  form	  is	  unintentional	  coding	  errors	  on	  the	  part	  of	  hospital	  staff	  as	  hospitals	  bill	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  using	  codes	  that	  indicate	  the	  service	  they	  provided	  to	  a	  patient.	  	  Unintentional	  coding	  errors	  on	  the	  part	  of	  hospital	  staff	  account	  for	  more	  than	  $10	  billion	  in	  wrongful	  payments	  (Health	  &	  Human	  Services,	  2008,	  pg.	  3).	  	  Improper	  payments	  also	  occur	  when	  hospital	  staff	  bill	  Medicare	  or	  Medicaid	  for	  services	  that	  are	  not	  covered	  under	  insurance	  or	  lack	  proper	  documentation	  (Health	  &	  Human	  Services,	  2008,	  p.	  6).	  	  	  	  	  The	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program	  (RAC)	  was	  designed	  to	  find	  and	  correct	  improper	  payments	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  Medicare	  Trust	  Fund.	  	  The	  RAC	  program	  was	  designed	  to	  calculate	  improper	  payment	  rates	  and	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identify	  areas	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  payment	  errors.	  	  The	  administrators	  of	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  were	  to	  use	  this	  information	  to	  prevent	  further	  improper	  payment.	  	  The	  RACs	  were	  also	  charged	  with	  auditing	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  hospital	  claims	  and	  correcting	  improper	  payments.	  	  This	  means	  that	  if	  a	  hospital	  was	  paid	  more	  than	  they	  should	  have	  been	  the	  RAC	  reclaimed	  the	  money	  for	  the	  Medicaid	  and	  Medicare	  trust	  funds.	  	  If	  a	  hospital	  did	  not	  receive	  enough	  payment,	  the	  RAC	  would	  ensure	  that	  they	  received	  correct	  reimbursement	  for	  services	  (Health	  &	  Human	  Services,	  2008,	  p.	  3).	  	  See	  Appendix	  A	  for	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  RAC	  program.	  The	  Medicare	  Modernization	  Act	  of	  2003	  implemented	  the	  3-­‐year	  RAC	  demonstration	  program	  to	  identify	  and	  correct	  fraud,	  waste,	  and	  abuse	  in	  the	  Medicare	  program.	  The	  Centers	  for	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  Services	  (CMS)	  implemented	  the	  RAC	  demonstration	  in	  2005.	  	  	  The	  demonstration	  took	  place	  in	  California,	  Florida,	  and	  New	  York	  because	  in	  2005	  these	  states	  received	  almost	  a	  quarter	  of	  all	  Medicare	  dollars	  paid	  to	  providers.	  	  Three	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contractors	  were	  selected,	  assigned	  to	  review	  claims	  from	  a	  single	  state,	  and	  given	  access	  to	  four	  years’	  worth	  of	  claims.	  	  The	  RAC	  was	  paid	  a	  percentage	  of	  each	  corrected	  claim.	  	  In	  2007,	  the	  successful	  demonstration	  was	  expanded	  to	  include	  Massachusetts,	  South	  Carolina,	  and	  Arizona	  (Centers	  for	  Medicare	  &	  Medicaid	  Services,	  2008).	  	  	  The	  RACs	  reviewed	  claims	  made	  by	  hospitals	  to	  Medicare.	  	  The	  RACs’	  first	  job	  was	  determining	  whether	  a	  claim	  met	  Medicare	  policies	  and	  regulations,	  and	  national	  and	  local	  coverage	  determinations.	  	  The	  process	  included	  automated	  and	  complex	  reviews	  of	  Medicare	  claims.	  	  Automated	  reviews	  occurred	  when	  the	  claim	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was	  in	  clear	  violation	  of	  the	  law.	  	  For	  example,	  an	  auditor	  could	  use	  a	  program	  to	  search	  for	  two	  of	  the	  same	  surgical	  procedures	  for	  the	  same	  patient	  on	  the	  same	  day.	  	  If	  the	  search	  shows	  duplicate	  claims	  for	  the	  same	  surgery	  when	  Medicare	  should	  only	  have	  paid	  for	  it	  once,	  the	  auditor	  has	  found	  an	  obvious	  improper	  payment	  using	  the	  automated	  method.	  When	  a	  claim	  appeared	  to	  be	  billed	  in	  error,	  but	  the	  error	  was	  not	  obvious,	  an	  auditor	  was	  authorized	  to	  conduct	  a	  complex	  review.	  	  In	  a	  complex	  review,	  the	  RAC	  requests	  medical	  records	  from	  the	  biller	  to	  conduct	  an	  in	  depth	  review.	  	  By	  2008,	  Congress	  hailed	  the	  RAC	  demonstration	  as	  a	  success.	  	  Auditing	  only	  0.3%	  of	  the	  4	  billion	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  3-­‐year	  period,	  the	  RACs	  corrected	  more	  than	  $1	  billion	  in	  improper	  Medicare	  claims.	  	  This	  is	  an	  extremely	  high	  success	  rate	  for	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  a	  program.	  	  However,	  much	  more	  manpower	  would	  be	  needed	  for	  the	  RACs	  to	  come	  close	  to	  correcting	  the	  estimated	  claims	  error	  rate	  of	  almost	  4%	  potentially	  totally	  more	  than	  $30	  billion	  (Centers	  for	  Medicare	  &	  Medicaid	  Services,	  2008,	  p.	  6).	  	  Approximately	  95%	  of	  the	  improper	  claims	  found	  by	  the	  demonstration	  overbilled	  Medicare,	  so	  the	  RAC	  recovered	  the	  improper	  payments	  for	  the	  Medicare	  Trust	  Fund.	  	  The	  remaining	  issues	  were	  underpayments	  to	  health	  care	  providers,	  resulting	  in	  more	  than	  $38	  million	  being	  paid	  to	  hospitals.	  After	  operating	  costs	  and	  refunded	  underpayments	  to	  providers,	  the	  RAC	  demonstration	  returned	  $693.6	  million	  to	  the	  Medicare	  Trust	  Fund	  in	  a	  three-­‐year	  period	  (Centers	  for	  Medicare	  &	  Medicaid	  Services,	  2008,	  p.	  2).	  CMS	  positively	  reviewed	  the	  RAC	  demonstration	  in	  2008	  and	  presented	  a	  nationwide	  implementation	  program	  with	  several	  modifications.	  	  CMS	  determined	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that	  permanent	  RACs	  be	  required	  to	  have	  a	  medical	  director	  and	  coding	  experts	  on	  staff.	  	  Permanent	  RACs	  would	  be	  required	  to	  pay	  back	  their	  fee	  if	  their	  corrected	  claim	  was	  disputed	  by	  providers	  and	  overturned	  at	  any	  level	  of	  appeal.	  	  RACs	  must	  disclose	  their	  contingency	  fee,	  create	  a	  claim	  status	  web	  page	  and	  provide	  the	  reason	  for	  a	  claim’s	  review	  when	  requesting	  more	  documents.	  	  These	  changes	  were	  designed	  to	  make	  the	  RAC	  program	  friendlier	  for	  providers.	  	  Given	  these	  changes	  Congress	  included	  Section	  302	  in	  The	  Tax	  Relief	  and	  Healthcare	  Act	  of	  2006	  and	  required	  the	  RAC	  program	  be	  implemented	  nationwide	  by	  2010	  (Centers	  for	  Medicare	  &	  Medicaid	  Services,	  2008,	  p.	  2).	  	  
Implementation	  of	  the	  RAC	  Program	  Nationwide	  In	  2009,	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program	  was	  launched	  nationwide.	  	  Initially,	  the	  program	  only	  audited	  Medicare	  Parts	  A	  &	  B.	  	  Part	  A	  is	  hospital	  insurance,	  which	  covers	  hospital	  stays,	  nursing	  home	  stays,	  hospice	  care,	  and	  home	  health	  care.	  	  Part	  B	  is	  medical	  insurance	  that	  includes	  doctor	  visits,	  outpatient	  care,	  home	  health	  care,	  certain	  medical	  equipment,	  and	  certain	  preventative	  care	  (Centers	  for	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  Services,	  2014,	  p.	  1).	  	  However,	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  of	  2010	  expanded	  the	  RAC	  program	  to	  include	  Medicare	  Parts	  C	  &	  D	  one	  year	  after	  the	  program	  went	  nationwide	  (Health	  &	  Human	  Services,	  2014,	  p.	  iv).	  	  Medicare	  Parts	  D	  covers	  prescription	  drugs,	  and	  Part	  C	  includes	  private	  insurance	  plans	  approved	  by	  Medicare	  (Centers	  for	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  Services,	  2014,	  p.2).	  CMS	  oversees	  the	  RACs	  that	  audit	  Medicare	  FFS	  programs,	  which	  include	  Parts	  A,	  B,	  C	  and	  D.	  	  States	  oversee	  the	  Medicaid	  RAC	  programs	  individually.	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In	  2014,	  CMS	  released	  a	  report	  to	  Congress	  evaluating	  the	  RAC	  program	  for	  the	  2012	  fiscal	  year.	  	  The	  report	  shows	  the	  success	  of	  the	  expanded,	  nationwide	  RAC	  program	  and	  allows	  an	  in	  depth	  look	  at	  the	  traditional	  RAC	  program	  and	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  Medicaid	  RAC	  in	  2010.	  	  In	  FY	  2012,	  RACs	  corrected	  more	  than	  1.2	  million	  claims	  and	  $2.4	  billion	  of	  improper	  payments.	  	  This	  resulted	  in	  $1.9	  billion	  returned	  to	  the	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  Trust	  Funds.	  	  In	  total,	  the	  Medicaid	  RACs	  have	  returned	  an	  impressive	  $57	  million	  to	  the	  Treasury.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  percentage	  of	  improper	  payments	  decreased	  from	  10.8%	  in	  2009	  to	  8.5%	  in	  2012.	  	  Taxpayers	  and	  legislators	  should	  see	  the	  return	  of	  wrongly	  spent	  tax	  dollars	  as	  a	  huge	  success.	  	  Appendix	  B	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  program.	  
	  	  	  Source:	  HHS	  FY	  2013	  Agency	  Financial	  Report	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *results	  exceeded	  target	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issue	  with	  several	  components	  of	  the	  RAC	  program.	  	  They	  claim	  that	  the	  RAC	  audits	  place	  an	  administrative	  burden	  on	  hospitals	  that	  takes	  away	  from	  the	  quality	  of	  care	  they	  can	  provide	  to	  their	  patients.	  	  The	  AHA	  also	  states	  that	  the	  audits	  increase	  the	  overall	  cost	  of	  the	  nation’s	  healthcare	  system.	  	  	  	  The	  AHAs	  believes	  that	  the	  RACs	  are	  improperly	  incentivized.	  	  RACs	  are	  paid	  by	  contingency	  fees,	  so	  they	  receive	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  funds	  they	  return	  to	  the	  federal	  government.	  	  The	  contingency	  fee	  generally	  ranges	  from	  nine	  to	  12%.	  	  The	  AHA	  reports	  that	  the	  pay	  structure	  incentivizes	  RACs	  to	  become	  ‘bounty	  hunters’	  by	  denying	  claims	  erroneously	  and	  focusing	  on	  high	  dollar	  claims	  (American	  Hospital	  Association,	  2014,	  p.	  1).	  	  	  	  The	  AHA	  states	  that	  this	  improper	  incentivization	  results	  in	  an	  unnecessary	  administrative	  burden.	  	  Since	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  RAC	  program,	  hospitals	  have	  to	  respond	  to	  requests	  for	  medical	  records	  when	  an	  auditor	  determines	  that	  a	  complex	  review	  of	  a	  claim	  is	  needed.	  	  The	  AHA	  reports	  that	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  records	  requests	  has	  forced	  hospitals	  to	  create	  a	  full	  time	  position	  that	  is	  responsible	  to	  responding	  solely	  to	  RAC	  audits.	  	  AHA	  reports	  that	  more	  than	  65%	  of	  hospitals	  spend	  at	  least	  $40,000	  in	  the	  RAC	  process	  (American	  Hospital	  Association,	  2015,	  p.1).	  	  Part	  of	  a	  RAC	  auditor’s	  determination	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  a	  claim	  concerns	  whether	  the	  medical	  necessity	  of	  a	  treatment	  or	  procedure.	  	  If	  the	  procedure	  was	  not,	  the	  Medicare	  trust	  fund	  is	  not	  obligated	  to	  reimburse	  the	  hospital.	  	  The	  AHA	  does	  not	  think	  that	  recovery	  auditors	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  administered	  treatment	  was	  medically	  necessary.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  denials	  were	  the	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result	  of	  confusion	  between	  ‘inpatient’	  and	  ‘outpatient’	  status.	  They	  take	  issue	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  auditors	  are	  making	  judgments	  about	  a	  physician’s	  decisions	  (American	  Hospital	  Association,	  2014,	  p.	  2).	  	  One	  of	  the	  AHA’s	  biggest	  issues	  is	  with	  the	  RAC	  denial	  appeals	  process.	  	  When	  a	  recovery	  auditor	  identifies	  an	  improper	  payment	  or	  claim,	  they	  deny	  it.	  	  The	  hospital	  can	  either	  accept	  the	  denial	  or	  enter	  the	  appeals	  process.	  	  However,	  the	  appeals	  courts	  have	  a	  massive	  backlog,	  sometimes	  a	  year	  or	  two	  years	  long.	  	  That	  means	  if	  a	  recovery	  auditor	  wrongly	  denies	  a	  claim	  the	  hospital	  may	  have	  to	  wait	  two	  years	  to	  receive	  payment	  for	  the	  procedure.	  	  This	  puts	  undue	  stress	  on	  hospitals	  (American	  Hospital	  Association,	  2014,	  p.4).	  	   In	  response	  to	  these	  issues,	  the	  AHA	  mounted	  a	  large	  lobbying	  push	  against	  the	  RAC	  program	  beginning	  in	  2011.	  	  According	  to	  their	  website,	  the	  AHA	  has	  filed	  lawsuits	  against	  the	  RACs,	  spoken	  against	  the	  RAC	  program	  in	  congressional	  hearings,	  published	  statistics	  in	  RACTrac	  reports,	  introduced	  multiple	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  to	  modify	  or	  dismantle	  the	  program,	  and	  actively	  lobbied	  legislative	  leaders	  on	  Capitol	  Hill.	  	  
RAC	  Audit	  Moratorium	  	   In	  August	  2013,	  CMS	  responded	  to	  AHA’s	  concerns	  about	  RAC	  auditors	  determining	  medical	  necessity.	  	  They	  implemented	  the	  Two	  Midnight	  Rule	  to	  help	  determine	  impatient	  versus	  outpatient	  status.	  	  The	  rule	  states	  that	  any	  patient	  in	  the	  hospital	  on	  observation	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  an	  inpatient	  only	  if	  they	  stay	  for	  two	  nights	  or	  longer.	  	  In	  September	  2013,	  CMS	  suspended	  RAC	  audits	  on	  short	  inpatient	  stays	  to	  allow	  hospitals	  and	  doctors	  time	  to	  adjust	  to	  the	  new	  Two	  Midnights	  rule.	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Recovery	  Audit	  Contract	  Program	  
Timeline	  2005-­‐2008	   The	  RAC	  Demonstration	  is	  a	  success	  
2009	   The	  RAC	  program	  is	  nationwide	  
2010	   RAC	  expanded	  to	  include	  Medicaid	  
2012	   Rac	  returns	  1.9	  billion	  
2013	   CMS	  suspends	  RAC	  audits	  from	  Septmber	  to	  December	  
2014	   Congress	  suspends	  audits	  until	  March	  
February	  CMS	  halts	  all	  auditing	  during	  transition	  to	  new	  contracts	  2015	   Only	  one	  RAC	  contract	  has	  been	  awarded	  adn	  there	  is	  no	  auditing	  	  




CHAPTER	  4:	  Termination	  of	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  
Program	  
	  
	   As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  the	  termination	  of	  government	  programs	  is	  more	  common	  than	  one	  might	  think,	  and	  is	  in	  fact,	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process.	  	  The	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  Program	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  While	  the	  program	  has	  not	  been	  terminated	  outright,	  the	  audit	  moratorium	  renders	  it	  unable	  to	  achieve	  its	  objective.	  	  The	  program	  lacked	  certain	  factors	  for	  longevity	  and	  had	  several	  termination	  factors.	  	  As	  a	  watchdog	  organization,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  RAC	  program	  may	  have	  made	  it	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  termination.	  	  
Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  Program	  –	  Factors	  for	  Longevity	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  Kaufman	  found	  that	  programs	  insulated	  from	  Congressional	  actions,	  have	  a	  strong	  relationship	  with	  congress,	  support	  from	  outside	  entities,	  and	  are	  endorsed	  by	  professional	  and	  trade	  associations	  have	  a	  much	  longer	  expected	  life	  span	  than	  programs	  that	  do	  not.	  	  The	  RAC	  program	  lacks	  each	  of	  these	  factors.	  	  	  One	  longevity	  factor,	  insulation	  from	  congressional	  action,	  is	  dependent	  upon	  how	  a	  program	  is	  designed.	  	  The	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program	  was	  born	  in	  a	  political	  landscape	  that	  encouraged	  government	  oversight.	  	  First	  as	  a	  demonstration	  program,	  it	  was	  implemented	  by	  congress	  in	  2003.	  	  Though	  a	  common	  beginning,	  this	  process	  does	  not	  bolster	  the	  program’s	  chance	  of	  long-­‐term	  success.	  	  The	  RAC	  program	  is	  not	  insulated	  from	  congressional	  or	  presidential	  decisions.	  	  Neither	  was	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the	  program	  created	  by	  a	  particular	  agency	  that	  has	  a	  stake	  in	  its	  continued	  success	  or	  ensures	  that	  it	  receives	  appropriations.	  	  These	  factors	  leave	  the	  program	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  landscape.	  	   The	  RAC	  program	  lacks	  another	  key	  for	  longevity,	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  congress.	  	  In	  2003,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  politicians	  in	  the	  Bush	  administration	  worked	  to	  have	  the	  RAC	  program	  installed.	  	  These	  men	  included	  Secretary	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  Tommy	  Thompson,	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House	  Denny	  Hastert,	  Senate	  Majority	  Leader	  Bill	  Frist,	  House	  Majority	  Leader	  Tom	  DeLay,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee	  Bill	  Thomas,	  and	  Senator	  John	  Breaux.	  	  Since	  2003,	  each	  of	  these	  men	  have	  retired	  from	  congress	  and	  no	  longer	  hold	  substantial	  enough	  political	  clout	  to	  block	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  RAC	  program.	  	  Additionally,	  then	  Ranking	  Member	  of	  the	  Finance	  Committee,	  Max	  Baucus,	  is	  now	  the	  United	  States	  Ambassador	  to	  China	  (Centers	  for	  Medicaid	  &	  Medicare	  Services,	  2003,	  p.	  3).	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  program’s	  relationship	  with	  congress	  diminished	  with	  each	  member	  whose	  tenure	  in	  Congress	  came	  to	  an	  end.	  	   However,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  of	  the	  original	  RAC	  supporters	  left	  in	  congress.	  	  In	  2003,	  Chuck	  Grassley	  was	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  Finance	  Committee.	  	  He	  now	  serves	  as	  the	  senior	  United	  States	  Senator	  from	  Iowa	  and	  chair	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  Committee.	  	  Senator	  Grassley	  still	  supports	  the	  ideals	  behind	  the	  RAC	  program	  stating,	  “Medical	  professionals	  who	  cheat	  Medicare	  by	  billing	  for	  more	  complex	  and	  costly	  services	  than	  they	  deliver	  threaten	  to	  drain	  the	  elderly	  healthcare	  program’s	  already	  shaky	  finances”	  (Schulte,	  2012).	  	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  completely	  support	  the	  RAC	  program	  as	  it	  is.	  	  In	  2012,	  Sen.	  Grassley	  and	  two	  others	  that	  helped	  install	  the	  RAC	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program,	  Senators	  Baucus	  and	  Hatch,	  signed	  a	  letter	  stating	  their	  concern	  that	  RACs’	  responsibilities	  overlap	  with	  another	  government	  program	  known	  as	  Zone	  Program	  Integrity	  Contractors	  (PICs)	  (Senators,	  2012).	  	  The	  members	  of	  congress	  left	  from	  the	  Bush	  administration	  may	  do	  more	  harm	  to	  the	  program’s	  relationship	  with	  congress	  than	  the	  members	  who	  no	  longer	  hold	  office.	  	  	  	   The	  RAC	  program	  lacks	  support	  from	  outside	  entities,	  as	  well	  as	  allies	  within	  congress.	  	  Outside	  entities	  include	  citizen	  groups	  and	  other	  government	  programs.	  The	  RAC	  program	  directly	  benefits	  the	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  trust	  funds.	  	  While	  citizens	  benefit	  from	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  services,	  the	  RAC	  program	  does	  not	  directly	  affect	  them.	  	  Therefore,	  citizens	  do	  not	  fight	  for	  the	  program.	  	  CMS	  is	  the	  government	  program	  that	  regulates	  the	  RAC	  program,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  benefit	  monetarily	  from	  its	  existence.	  	  Instead,	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  program	  makes	  CMS	  very	  unlikely	  to	  vocally	  support	  the	  RAC	  program.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  program	  does	  not	  enjoy	  the	  lobbying	  efforts	  of	  citizens	  or	  other	  organizations	  that	  could	  improve	  its	  projected	  lifespan.	  	  Finally,	  the	  RAC	  program	  does	  not	  enjoy	  the	  endorsement	  of	  healthcare	  or	  auditing	  trade	  and	  professional	  associations.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  trade	  and	  professional	  associations	  that	  would	  likely	  be	  the	  program’s	  greatest	  allies	  have	  turned	  against	  them.	  	  The	  American	  Hospital	  Association	  has	  mounted	  incredible	  efforts	  to	  have	  the	  program	  terminated.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  RAC	  program	  faces	  an	  almost	  complete	  lack	  of	  support	  from	  outside	  entities.	  	  	  	   According	  to	  Kaufman,	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program	  lacks	  four	  of	  the	  seven	  factors	  that	  promote	  program	  longevity.	  	  The	  program	  is	  subject	  to	  the	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will	  of	  congress	  and	  the	  president.	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  legislators	  that	  helped	  install	  the	  program	  have	  left	  office,	  the	  program	  lacks	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  the	  nation’s	  current	  lawmakers.	  	  Neither	  does	  it	  enjoy	  the	  backing	  of	  outside	  entities	  or	  constituencies	  to	  support	  its	  work.	  	  Without	  any	  of	  the	  key	  factors	  that	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  a	  program’s	  survival,	  the	  program	  seems	  to	  be	  constructed	  for	  a	  shorter	  lifespan.	  	  
Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  Program	  –	  Factors	  for	  Termination	  
	   Just	  as	  Kaufman	  identified	  factors	  that	  increase	  government	  programs’	  lifespans,	  DeLeon	  presented	  three	  main	  factors	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  program’s	  termination.	  	  The	  factors	  for	  termination	  include	  financial	  imperatives,	  government	  efficiencies,	  and	  political	  ideology.	  	  The	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program	  is	  affected	  by	  each	  of	  them	  in	  the	  following	  ways.	  	   The	  push	  for	  governmental	  efficiency	  negatively	  influences	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  bureaucratic	  leaders	  are	  debating	  whether	  the	  program’s	  benefits	  are	  worth	  its	  costs.	  	  The	  RAC	  program	  returns	  millions	  of	  dollars	  of	  wrongly	  dispersed	  money	  to	  the	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  trust	  funds	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  protect	  the	  program	  from	  fraud,	  waste,	  and	  abuse.	  	  The	  cost	  falls	  on	  the	  hospitals	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  administrative	  burden.	  	  The	  hospitals	  have	  to	  provide	  the	  RAC	  auditors	  with	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  medical	  information.	  	  	  Another	  dimension	  that	  adds	  to	  the	  inefficiency	  factor	  is	  the	  program’s	  mission.	  	  The	  RACs	  are	  only	  one	  program	  that	  seeks	  program	  integrity	  in	  healthcare.	  	  As	  demonstrated	  by	  Appendix	  C,	  several	  other	  contractors	  audit	  hospitals	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  claims	  as	  well.	  	  This	  results	  in	  overlapping	  initiatives.	  	  When	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programs’	  initiatives	  overlap	  congress	  generally	  decides	  which	  is	  inefficient	  and	  moves	  to	  alter	  that	  program.	  	  By	  DeLeon’s	  standards,	  the	  RAC	  program	  may	  be	  inefficient	  on	  two	  fronts.	  	   However,	  the	  RAC	  program	  is	  fairly	  insulated	  from	  political	  ideology	  changes.	  	  The	  program	  was	  implemented	  in	  2003	  under	  the	  Bush	  administration	  with	  bi-­‐partisan	  support.	  	  In	  2010,	  the	  program	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  Affordable	  Care	  Act.	  	  As	  an	  organization	  that	  works	  to	  promote	  program	  integrity	  and	  protect	  public	  tax	  dollars	  it	  enjoys	  approval	  of	  both	  political	  parties.	  	  The	  Recovery	  Contracting	  Program	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  strictly	  Republican	  or	  Democratic	  program,	  so	  it	  is	  fairly	  insulated	  from	  changes	  in	  political	  ideologies.	  	  	   Unlike	  the	  majority	  of	  government	  programs,	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  government’s	  financial	  imperative.	  	  The	  RACs	  are	  self-­‐sufficient	  and	  do	  not	  require	  government	  money	  to	  operate.	  	  RACs	  are	  contracted	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  paid	  a	  percentage	  of	  every	  claim	  returned	  to	  the	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  trust	  funds.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  returned	  claims	  has	  covered	  the	  program’s	  operating	  costs	  since	  the	  second	  year	  of	  operation.	  	  Since	  then,	  the	  program	  has	  returned	  nearly	  $100	  million	  to	  the	  government.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  program	  is	  uniquely	  insulated	  from	  budget	  cuts	  and	  economic	  fluctuation.	  	  The	  RAC	  is	  also	  unaffected	  by	  programs	  vying	  for	  government	  funds.	  	  The	  RAC	  is	  unaffected	  by	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  factors	  for	  termination.	  	   Only	  one	  of	  Kaufman’s	  three	  factors	  for	  termination	  directly	  applies	  to	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program.	  	  The	  RAC	  program	  is	  one	  of	  several	  government	  initiatives	  that	  seek	  to	  identify	  wrongly	  dispersed	  Medicare	  and	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Medicaid	  payments.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  major	  opposition	  to	  the	  program	  is	  in	  the	  name	  of	  governmental	  efficiency.	  	  However,	  the	  RAC	  is	  insulated	  from	  political	  ideology	  changes	  and	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  government	  for	  funds	  to	  operate.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  program	  will	  be	  terminated	  for	  differences	  in	  political	  ideology	  or	  lack	  of	  government	  funding.	  
How	  Long	  Should	  the	  RAC	  Have	  Lasted?	  The	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  Program	  has	  a	  unique	  combination	  of	  factors	  that	  determine	  the	  lifespan	  of	  a	  government	  program.	  	  According	  to	  Kaufman,	  the	  RAC	  program	  is	  devoid	  of	  most	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  promote	  longevity	  as	  it	  lacks	  a	  strong	  relationship	  with	  congress,	  outside	  entities,	  and	  professional	  associations.	  	  Given	  this	  information,	  it	  appears	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  program	  itself	  lends	  it	  to	  termination.	  	  However,	  the	  same	  nature	  also	  insulates	  it	  from	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  factors	  for	  termination.	  	  Inefficiency	  is	  the	  only	  termination	  factor	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  end	  the	  program.	  	  Analyzed	  in	  this	  fashion,	  it	  appears	  that	  though	  the	  program	  lacks	  longevity	  factors,	  it	  should	  operate	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  because	  there	  is	  only	  one	  reason	  for	  termination.	  	  
Mechanisms	  of	  Termination	  
	   Analyzed	  using	  Kaufman’s	  method,	  the	  RAC	  program	  should	  have	  a	  long	  lifespan	  without	  much	  fear	  of	  termination.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  phrase	  ‘termination	  of	  a	  government	  program’	  does	  not	  always	  indicate	  the	  program	  in	  question	  is	  defunded	  and	  immediately	  shut	  down.	  	  Rather,	  ‘termination’	  includes	  a	  variety	  of	  changes	  to	  an	  organization,	  such	  as	  a	  change	  of	  mission	  statement,	  goals,	  or	  duties.	  	  However,	  contrary	  to	  the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  by	  Kaufman’s	  principles,	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	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Contracting	  moratorium	  renders	  the	  program	  ‘terminated,’	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes.	  	  Several	  mechanisms	  of	  termination	  including	  political	  clout,	  reform,	  and	  commission	  were	  utilized	  against	  the	  RAC	  program	  (Jenkins,	  Mondelli,	  Wilson,	  2007).	  	   Political	  clout	  is	  a	  very	  effective	  termination	  mechanism.	  	  Generally,	  political	  forces	  put	  government	  programs	  in	  place,	  so	  it	  follows	  that	  they	  also	  play	  an	  influential	  role	  in	  their	  termination.	  	  Political	  clout	  includes	  the	  actions	  and	  lack	  of	  action	  by	  single	  politicians,	  groups	  of	  politicians,	  or	  lobbying	  institutions.	  	  The	  driving	  force	  for	  elected	  officials	  is	  re-­‐election,	  so	  they	  will	  fight	  the	  termination	  of	  programs	  that	  benefit	  their	  constituents.	  	  Elected	  officials	  may	  also	  use	  their	  profile	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  issues	  with	  a	  program.	  	  Political	  clout	  plays	  a	  large	  part	  in	  determining	  the	  lifespan	  of	  a	  government	  program	  (Jenkins,	  Mondelli,	  Wilson,	  2007).	  As	  for	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program,	  political	  clout	  is	  the	  most	  effective	  termination	  mechanism.	  	  Influential	  elected	  officials	  and	  the	  American	  Hospital	  Association	  opposed	  the	  RAC	  program.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  program	  itself	  worked	  against	  it.	  	  The	  American	  people	  as	  a	  whole	  benefit	  from	  program	  integrity	  work,	  but	  no	  one	  group	  of	  people	  sees	  tangible	  benefits.	  	  This	  results	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  positive	  lobbying.	  	  Simultaneously,	  members	  of	  congress	  whose	  states	  include	  a	  large	  hospital	  network	  receive	  pressure	  to	  end	  a	  largely	  beneficial	  program.	  	  In	  February	  of	  2014,	  111	  members	  of	  congress	  signed	  a	  letter	  to	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  Secretary	  Kathleen	  Sebelius	  urging	  her	  to	  consider	  a	  total	  restructuring	  of	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the	  program	  (Pittman,	  2014).	  	  The	  letter	  is	  just	  one	  example	  of	  the	  political	  clout	  being	  used	  to	  terminate	  the	  RAC	  program.	  	   Reform	  is	  also	  a	  mechanism	  for	  termination,	  as	  it	  alters	  a	  program’s	  original	  intent.	  	  Therefore,	  members	  of	  congress	  who	  call	  for	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  RAC	  program	  are	  also	  calling	  for	  its	  termination.	  	  For	  example,	  H.R.	  1250,	  the	  Medicare	  Audit	  Improvement	  Act,	  proposes	  changes	  to	  the	  program	  that	  alter	  its	  responsibilities,	  scope,	  and	  ability	  to	  fulfill	  its	  purpose	  to	  fight	  fraud.	  	  The	  bill	  suggests	  a	  sizable	  reduction	  in	  the	  type	  and	  number	  of	  claims	  an	  auditor	  could	  examine	  (Library	  of	  Congress,	  n.d.).	  	  The	  passage	  of	  this	  reform	  would	  in	  effect,	  terminate	  the	  RAC	  program.	  	   Commissioning	  is	  the	  least	  threatening	  termination	  mechanism	  for	  the	  RAC	  program.	  	  Governments	  use	  a	  termination	  method	  called	  commissioning	  to	  identify	  inefficient	  programs.	  	  Once	  a	  program	  is	  deemed	  inefficient,	  the	  government	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  reduce	  it’s	  funding.	  Generally,	  a	  government	  agency	  will	  evaluate	  the	  success	  of	  programs	  in	  their	  domain.	  	  The	  agency	  conducts	  the	  assessment	  as	  a	  third	  party	  and	  makes	  suggestions	  regarding	  improvements,	  issues,	  and	  funding.	  	  The	  government	  may	  use	  commissioning	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  identify	  inefficient	  programs	  to	  defund.	  	  The	  RAC	  program	  is	  protected	  from	  the	  commission	  process	  because	  it	  does	  not	  rely	  directly	  on	  government	  funds.	  	  Instead,	  the	  program’s	  operating	  costs	  are	  covered	  by	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  money	  it	  returns	  to	  the	  federal	  government.	  	  However,	  commission	  can	  damage	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  RAC	  program.	  	  If	  a	  commissioned	  report	  on	  another	  program	  identifies	  the	  RAC	  program	  to	  be	  inefficient	  it	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  terminated	  through	  another	  mechanism.	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While	  the	  commissioning	  mechanism	  cannot	  end	  the	  RAC	  program,	  it	  may	  provide	  ammunition	  for	  those	  looking	  to	  terminate	  the	  program	  through	  another	  mechanism.	  	  	   Political	  clout,	  reform	  and	  commission	  are	  each	  Mechanisms	  for	  Termination	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  combat	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  political	  clout	  is	  two	  fold.	  	  First,	  outside	  lobbying	  groups	  used	  their	  political	  clout	  to	  create	  a	  negative	  perception	  of	  the	  program	  among	  legislative	  leaders.	  	  Second,	  as	  a	  ‘watch	  dog’	  the	  RAC	  program	  benefits	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  its	  benefits	  are	  not	  tangible	  to	  a	  particular	  subset	  of	  the	  American	  people.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  lacks	  the	  political	  clout	  of	  a	  constituency	  to	  combat	  the	  lobbying	  groups.	  	  The	  mechanisms	  of	  reform	  and	  commission	  work	  in	  tandem.	  	  Legislators	  use	  the	  information	  from	  commissioned	  studies	  of	  the	  RAC	  program	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General	  and	  United	  States	  Government	  Accountability	  Office	  to	  present	  reforms	  to	  the	  program	  that	  will	  alter	  its	  goals,	  scope	  and	  missions	  statement	  –	  effectively	  terminating	  the	  program.	  	  	  
Watchdog	  Agencies	  are	  Inherently	  More	  Likely	  to	  be	  Terminated	  
	   Just	  as	  John	  Schiller,	  the	  whistleblower	  who	  first	  brought	  attention	  to	  the	  fraud	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system,	  can	  be	  called	  a	  ‘watch	  dog’,	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  watchdog	  program.	  	  “Government	  watchdogs	  are	  those	  who	  perform	  oversight	  to	  ensure	  accountability	  that	  reduces	  fraud,	  waste,	  abuse,	  and	  corruption	  in	  government”	  (Feldman,	  Eichenthal	  15).	  	  	  These	  programs	  hold	  others	  accountable	  and	  seek	  a	  solution	  that	  extends	  to	  multiple	  cases.	  	  The	  initiative	  of	  the	  RAC	  program	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  Medicare	  and	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Medicaid	  trust	  funds	  by	  identifying	  fraud,	  waste,	  and	  abuse	  –	  making	  it	  the	  epitome	  of	  a	  watchdog	  organization.	  	  This	  fact	  may	  help	  explain	  the	  deviation	  of	  the	  RAC	  program	  from	  Kaufman’s	  lifespan	  projection.	  	  	  Through	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  RAC	  program,	  I	  have	  concluded	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  watchdog	  organizations	  makes	  them	  more	  susceptible	  to	  termination	  than	  other	  programs.	  	  Generally,	  these	  programs	  will	  lack	  two	  longevity	  factors	  –	  a	  strong	  relationship	  with	  congress	  over	  time	  and	  strong	  support	  from	  outside	  entities.	  	  Watchdog	  organizations	  may	  enjoy	  favor	  with	  congress	  during	  the	  administration	  in	  which	  they	  are	  implemented.	  	  However,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  RAC	  study,	  after	  those	  individuals	  have	  left	  office,	  no	  one	  in	  congress	  may	  feel	  a	  particular	  allegiance	  to	  the	  program.	  	  This	  is	  in	  part	  because	  generally,	  watchdog	  organizations	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  a	  particular	  constituency	  does	  not	  feel	  the	  benefits	  of	  their	  work.	  	  Therefore,	  members	  of	  congress	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  actively	  engaged	  in	  the	  program’s	  welfare.	  	  In	  fact,	  legislators	  are	  likely	  to	  receive	  lobbying	  efforts	  against	  watchdog	  organizations	  because	  they	  create	  more	  work	  for	  government	  organizations	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  ensure	  that	  everything	  is	  being	  done	  legally.	  	  The	  government	  organizations	  that	  watchdogs	  monitor	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  supportive	  because	  of	  administrative	  burden	  and	  the	  watchdog’s	  work	  generally	  does	  not	  impact	  a	  particular	  group	  of	  people,	  so	  while	  people	  may	  like	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  program,	  outside	  entities	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  actively	  supportive	  of	  the	  watchdog.	  The	  programs	  will	  also	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  two	  termination	  factors	  –	  government	  inefficiency	  and	  the	  government’s	  financial	  imperative.	  	  Watchdog	  organizations	  create	  administrative	  burden	  on	  the	  organizations	  that	  they	  monitor.	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CHAPTER	  5:	  Conclusion	  	  This	  case	  study	  is	  a	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  Recovery	  Audit	  Contracting	  program.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  has	  particular	  limitations.	  	  The	  RAC	  program	  is	  one	  instance	  of	  a	  watchdog	  program,	  so	  the	  presented	  characteristics	  of	  watchdog	  programs	  may	  not	  apply	  to	  every	  program.	  	  Also,	  the	  conclusions	  of	  this	  study	  may	  not	  be	  generalizable	  to	  every	  government	  program	  or	  watchdog	  program.	  	  Another	  limitation	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  impartial,	  credible	  evaluations	  of	  the	  RAC	  program	  from	  2014	  and	  2015.	  	  While	  all	  case	  studies	  have	  limitations,	  the	  RAC	  program	  case	  study	  may	  be	  used	  in	  several	  ways.	  	  The	  RAC	  case	  study	  exposes	  several	  major	  issues	  in	  our	  government.	  	  First,	  I	  argue	  watchdog	  programs	  developed	  to	  ensure	  accountability	  and	  protect	  the	  public	  interest	  are	  inherently	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  terminated	  than	  other	  government	  programs.	  	  In	  fact,	  functional	  watchdog	  initiatives	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  shorter	  lifespans	  than	  inefficient	  or	  outdated	  government	  programs.	  	  Watchdog	  organizations	  that	  successfully	  achieve	  their	  objective	  should	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  termination.	  	  This	  study	  may	  be	  used	  in	  the	  development	  of	  future	  watchdog	  organizations	  to	  increase	  the	  factors	  for	  longevity	  and	  avoid	  termination	  factors	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  increase	  the	  program’s	  lifespan.	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The	  single	  most	  impactful	  factor	  in	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  RAC	  program	  was	  lack	  of	  support	  from	  outside	  entities.	  	  This	  shows	  the	  power	  interest	  groups	  have	  over	  government	  programs.	  	  The	  medical	  industry	  is	  one	  of	  the	  nation’s	  largest	  industries.	  	  When	  hospitals	  faced	  the	  administrative	  burden	  of	  claim	  audits	  and	  were	  forced	  to	  repay	  the	  government	  excess	  received	  funds,	  the	  AHA	  poured	  millions	  of	  dollars	  into	  lobbying	  efforts	  to	  stop	  the	  program.	  	  Despite	  the	  RAC’s	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  lifespan	  of	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid,	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  able	  to	  effectively	  terminate	  the	  program.	  	  This	  shows	  the	  power	  of	  big	  business	  to	  influence	  not	  just	  policy,	  but	  the	  direction	  of	  such	  important	  programs	  as	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid.	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